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Abstract
This review of Chris Wickham’s Framing the Early Middle Ages situates the book within the 
context of his earlier writings on the transition to feudalism, and contrasts his explanation for 
and dating of the process with those of the two main opposing positions set out in Perry 
Anderson’s Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (1974) and Guy Bois’s The Transformation of the 
Year One Thousand (1989). Although Framing modifies some of Wickham’s earlier positions, it 
largely sidesteps explicit theoretical discussion for a compellingly detailed empirical study which 
extends to almost the entire territorial extent of the former Roman Empire. The review focuses 
on three main themes raised by Wickham’s important work: the existence or otherwise of a 
‘peasant’-mode of production and its relationship to the ‘Asiatic’ mode; the nature of state-
formation and the question of when a state can be said to have come into existence; and the rôle 
of different types of class-struggle – slave-rebellions, tax-revolts and peasant-uprisings – in 
establishing the feudal system.
Keywords
Marxism, Chris Wickham, Perry Anderson, Guy Bois, peasant-mode of production, state, class-
struggle
Why should readers of Historical Materialism consider reading a book by a 
specialist in early-Italian history, containing 831 pages of text and dealing 
with Europe and the Mediterranean world between the fifth and ninth 
centuries AD? Framing the Early Middle Ages was awarded the Deutscher 
Memorial-Prize for 2006, which suggests that it may interest a wider audience 
than the fellow-medievalists Chris Wickham addresses in his Introduction. 
There, ‘you the reader’, is assumed to belong to a group of ‘experts’ who 
‘often . . . know far more than I about a given set of materials’.1 In the case of 
this reviewer, Wickham need have no such concerns, since my area of expertise 
lies in a historical period which opens nearly 900 years after his closes and with 
1. Wickham 2005, p. 9.
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a country (Scotland) which he specifically excludes from discussion.2 My 
purpose here will therefore not be to dispute with Wickham over, for example, 
his explanation for why there are greater similarities between Syro-Palestinian 
and Italian ceramics than between either of these and ceramics of Egyptian 
origin.3 Instead, I approach the book in the same way as most other non-
specialist readers of this journal: as a Marxist interested in what a fellow-
Marxist has to say about a crucial, but deeply obscure turning-point in human 
history and what implications his work has for Marxist theory. As we shall see, 
his work is full of interest in both respects.
Wickham and the debate on the first transition
There have been recurrent debates over the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism. There have even been extended discussions over the transition 
from capitalism to socialism – an event which, as we are all too painfully 
aware, has not yet successfully taken place. As a result, we have some idea of 
the relationship between economic transition and social revolution in both 
cases. By contrast, the emergence of feudalism has been relatively neglected by 
all the major intellectual traditions which seek to explain long-term socio-
economic development, including Marxism.4 In the first volume of Mann’s 
The Sources of Social Power, for example, his conclusions concerning the decline 
and fall of the Roman Empire are followed by an extended discussion of 
Christianity and rival religions, before beginning a survey of twelfth-century 
Europe, considered solely in so far as it provides the setting for capitalist 
development.5 Mann can at least argue that, as a non-Marxist, he does not 
find the concept of feudalism useful, but even a work as firmly situated within 
the classical-Marxist tradition as Harman’s A People’s History of the World deals 
with the subject in a summary-fashion which is noticeably different from the 
later treatment of the transition to capitalism.6
2. Wickham 2005, p. 6, n. 6.
3. Wickham 2005, pp. 728–41, 759–80.
4. For some preliminary comparisons and contrasts between three great transitions-
revolutions, see Davidson 2005b, pp. 36–47, although the purpose of the discussion is to identify 
the specificity of the bourgeois revolution, rather than that of its predecessor.
5. Mann 1986, pp. 295–8, 371–6. In a review-article, Wickham criticised Mann’s assumption 
that capitalism was already implicit in developments within medieval Europe, but does not 
broach his failure to discuss the emergence of feudalism in the first place. See Wickham 1988, 
pp. 73–5.
6. Compare Harman 1999, pp. 85–6, 104–5 (the transition to feudalism), and pp. 161–374 
(the transition to capitalism). 
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In one sense, this is unsurprising, since the Marxist classics are relatively 
silent on the subject. The most famous discussion, by Engels in The Origins of 
the Family, Private Property and the State (1884), summarises over four-hundred 
years of history in around twelve pages. For Engels, the pressures caused by 
imperial taxation had already set in motion the economic crisis of the Empire, 
as a result of which the declining profitability of slavery, in both the great 
estates and artisanal workshops, led to landlords settling former slaves as 
hereditary tenants.7 There is nothing uniquely Marxist about this explanation, 
except perhaps the stress Engels places on the Germanic invasions in embedding 
the ‘barbarian’ gentile-constitution which supposedly gave peasant-society a 
community-structure and an institutional means of emancipation from 
servitude. Important essays by Weber (1896) and Bloch (written between the 
World-Wars, but published posthumously in 1947) also privileged the 
changing position of the slaves, although with different emphases. For Weber, 
the decisive point was when the territorial limits of the Empire were reached, 
leading to difficulties in acquiring new slaves with which to replace the existing 
workforce, since actual reproduction – breeding slaves rather than capturing 
or buying them – would have required massive levels of investment that 
landlords were unwilling to make.8 Bloch is, in some ways, closer to Engels, 
but adds an additional component in claiming that the new class of serfs arose, 
not only from a loosening of the conditions of absolute servitude hitherto 
imposed on the slaves, but a tightening of the relative liberty previously 
enjoyed by free peasants.9 None of these contributions referred to revolution 
as such. Those that did tended to be non-Marxist, and focussed on a much 
later period. Southern famously wrote of the period between 970 and 1215: 
‘The slow emergence of a knightly aristocracy which set the social tone of 
Europe for hundreds of years contains no dramatic events or clearly decisive 
moments such as those which have marked the course of the other great social 
revolutions.’ It was the almost-imperceptible quality of the transformation 
that led him to describe it as the ‘silent revolution of these centuries’.10
Serious Marxist discussion of the subject took place over a relatively 
short period towards the end of the last century, culminating in a series of 
exchanges in Past and Present across 1996–7. Since Wickham made several 
important contributions to that discussion, it may be worth recapitulating 
the key-positions, including his own, to contextualise his latest book. Two 
works, Anderson’s Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (1974) and Bois’s The 
 7. Engels 1990, pp. 245–56.
 8. Weber 1976, pp. 397–408. 
 9. Bloch 1975, pp. 1–31.
10. Southern 1953, p. 15.
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Transformation of the Year One Thousand (1989), conveniently set out the main 
opposing explanations and timescales for the emergence of feudalism.
For Anderson, there is a period of socio-economic transition which begins 
with the barbarian-settlement within the Roman Empire in the West, but is 
concluded only several centuries after its collapse: ‘The catastrophic collision 
of two mutually dissolving anterior modes of production – primitive and 
ancient – eventually produced the feudal order which spread throughout 
medieval Europe.’11 Given that the pre-existing modes were embedded in 
social formations occupying geographically separate areas of Europe, feudalism 
was initially marked by spatial unevenness:
In effect, the core region of European feudalism was that in which a ‘balanced 
synthesis’ of Roman and Germanic elements occurred: essentially, Northern 
France and zones contiguous to it, the homeland of the Carolingian Empire. To 
the South of this area, in Provence, Italy or Spain, the dissolution and 
recombination of barbarian and ancient modes of production occurred under the 
dominant legacy of Antiquity. To the North and East of it, in Germany, 
Scandinavia and England, where Roman rule had never reached or had taken 
only shallow root, there was conversely a slow transition towards feudalism, 
under the indigenous dominance of the barbarian heritage.12
The prolonged period during which fusion took place meant that the pre-
existing modes were not transformed immediately, but, for Anderson, there is 
no suggestion that they continued to exist anywhere as dominant after the 
sixth century, although examples could, of course, be found of free-peasant 
communities on the one hand, and of slaves on the other.
Anderson could draw on some passing suggestions by Marx himself in the 
Grundrisse, where the notion of ‘synthesis’ was first deployed, as his authority.13 
The main support for this position came, however, from Russian and Eastern-
European academics such as Elena Mikhailovna Shtaerman, although it was 
by no means universally accepted by all their colleagues.14 Anderson refuses to 
contemplate the existence of feudalism prior to the fall of the Roman Empire 
and he is, of course, scarcely alone in taking this position. As Finley once 
wrote, ‘On any account chattel slavery ceased to be dominant even in Italy by 
the fourth or fifth century whereas it is improper to speak of feudalism before 
the time of Charlemagne, leaving a “transition” lasting three or four hundred 
11. Anderson 1974a, p. 128.
12. Anderson 1974b, pp. 154–5.
13. Marx 1973, pp. 97–8.
14. Haldon 1989, p. 7; Haldon 1993, pp. 73–4. Anderson expresses disagreement with 
Shtaerman in several contexts, but does refer to her work in relation to the transition itself. See 
Anderson 1974a, p. 61, n. 9; Anderson 1974a, p. 83, n. 43; and Anderson 1974a, p. 85, n. 48. 
 N. Davidson / Historical Materialism 19.1 (2011) 73–97 77
years.’15 Why Finley finds it is improper is not clear, but the same position was 
also taken by his great opponent, Ste Croix. Whilst the latter was prepared to 
acknowledge the existence of serfdom as one of the three forms of unfree 
labour in the ancient world (along with chattel-slavery and debt-bondage), he 
opposed the idea that this demonstrated the existence of feudal relations of 
production, describing this as a ‘groundless connection’. Again, the grounds of 
his objection are not entirely clear, other than that this would involve the 
discovery of feudalism across the Greek world prior to the Hellenistic period, 
although he recognises that there are ‘closely related (though not identical) 
forms in Graceo-Roman antiquity and in the Middle Ages’.16 Ste Croix’s 
unwillingness to recognise the existence of feudalism may signal his adherence 
to a Social-Democratic or Stalinist notion of successive stages of social 
development. In the case of Anderson, the reason is different. He is committed 
to the view that capitalism emerged as an indigenous system only in Western 
Europe. Although he sees feudalism as having a slightly-wider territorial extent 
(it also includes Japan), the conditions for the emergence of capitalism are 
only present in Western Europe because the genesis of feudalism there took a 
peculiarly ‘synthetic’ form, allowing what Anderson sees as the distinctive 
element – the cultural and juridical heritage of classical antiquity – to be 
transmitted into the new system.17 As this suggests, Anderson’s definition of 
feudalism is based on its superstructural characteristics – a necessity, in his 
view, since all pre-capitalist class-societies other than slavery are based on the 
exploitation of a peasantry by landlords.18 Feudalism, therefore, cannot have 
existed during the lifetime of the Roman Empire, as these characteristics were 
absent. It is, of course, quite possible to explain the priority of capitalism in 
Western Europe without recourse to idealist speculations about the heritage of 
classical antiquity. The key-point in the context of this discussion, however, is 
Anderson’s chronology: the end of the Empire in the West during the fifth 
century sets in train a process which led to the emergence of feudalism.
Bois would agree that feudalism did not predate the end of the Roman 
Empire, but, in every other respect, his account is the opposite of Anderson’s. 
Far from slavery beginning a long transformation virtually from the moment 
the social organisation of the barbarian-tribes began to interpenetrate with 
that of the Romans, Bois claims that it remained the dominant mode until the 
tenth century, notably in the areas where Charlemagne had attempted to 
preserve the political form of the Western Empire. Accordingly, Bois emphasises 
15. Finley 1983, p. 180.
16. Ste. Croix 1981, pp. 136, 138, 267–9.
17. Anderson 1974b, pp. 420–9.
18. Anderson 1974b, pp. 403–10. His definition of feudalism can be found on p. 407.
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not the process of transition, but a moment of revolution around 1000, which 
he describes as a ‘European phenomenon’.19 Drawing on events in the village 
of Lournard in Cluny to support his thesis, he describes a situation of ‘dual 
power’ between the monks of the monastery of Cluny, bearers of the new 
feudal order, and the existing masters, the Carolingian defenders of slavery:
The driving force behind this movement was a faction within the aristocracy, or, 
to be more precise, within the high aristocracy in its monastic dimension. This 
was done almost despite itself. The sole concern of the first Cluniacs was to assure 
their independence with regard to the lay powers and to reform monasticism. 
However, this concern led them to develop close ties with the peasantry. There 
was thus an identity of interest (the peasantry feeling themselves threatened by 
the local grandees) and even an ideological rapprochement, to the extent that 
monastic spirituality coincided with the moral needs of the peasantry. From this 
moment on the old order was threatened. As often happens in such cases, the 
signal for hostilities was given by the champions of the past, by that local 
aristocracy, warrior and slave-owning, which formed the social base of the 
Carolingian system, but which saw its position being eroded. By unleashing 
violence, it plunged society into anarchy, thus compelling the monks to assume 
responsibilities in the social sphere and define a new order: the first draft of feudal 
society.20
Bois was the last in a series of French historians, beginning with George Duby, 
who had introduced the notion of a feudal revolution by way of an analogy 
with the bourgeois revolution.21 (Although, by the time Bois’ book appeared 
in France, Duby had rejected both the term and the notion.)22 There are two 
main objections to Bois’s, account of the process. The first is empirical. His 
material is too narrowly based on one small area of France and cannot be 
generalised across the whole of Europe: slaves existed in estates east of the 
Rhine where Roman influence was minimal, and labour-services were 
innovations in Italy during the eighth and ninth centuries, not a legacy from 
antiquity.23 The second is theoretical. His definition of a slave is too fixated on 
the legal category and not enough on the actual relationship of the direct 
producers so categorised to the means of production. In other words, many of 
these slaves were, in fact, nearer to the free peasants – notably in their interest 
in raising output – than the slaves who laboured in the fields, mines or 
19. Bois 1992, p. 135.
20. Bois 1992, p. 152.
21. Duby 1980, pp. 147–66; Bonnassie 1991, pp. 104–31. Although the term is not used, 
the same concept and chronology can also be found in Poly and Bournazel 1991, pp. 2–3, 
118–40, 351–7 and Dockès 1982, pp. 105–10. 
22. Duby 1991.
23. Verhulst 1991, pp. 200–2.
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households of antiquity.24 Nevertheless, a diluted version of the ‘feudal-
revolution’ thesis has now been mainstreamed, shorn of the Marxism-
framework to which Bois at least had subscribed, to the extent that the term 
‘revolution’ can be used to describe changes around the first millennium 
without specifying the transition to any particular mode of production, as in 
Moore’s The First European Revolution, c. 970–1215.25
Where did Wickham stand in this debate? In two important articles, ‘The 
Other Transition’ (1984) and ‘The Uniqueness of the East’ (1985), he 
established his own distinct position. Against Anderson, he claimed that 
feudalism already existed in 300 AD, so that it could not have been the result 
of a synthesis of German barbarism and Roman slavery. Indeed, as Wickham 
points out, ‘in so far as the German invaders had such things as a landed 
aristocracy, these largely resulted from Roman influence’.26 Against the French 
tradition of ‘feudal revolution’, which was shortly to culminate in Bois’s, work, 
he claimed that this pre-existing feudal mode of production had become 
the dominant mode by 700 AD, by which time ‘the balance shifted’ from 
the hitherto dominant ancient mode.27 The transition from slave to serf, 
through the mechanism of labour-service, was, he claimed, ‘marginal’ to the 
transition – indeed, he sees the peasantry as major beneficiaries of the entire 
process. He does note that increased surplus-extraction from peasants was 
occurring during the ninth and especially tenth centuries, but this is 
characteristic of the end of the first phase of feudal development, not the 
transition to feudalism itself. Whatever happened around 1000 AD could 
scarcely have been a revolution then, since the fundamental change had already 
been completed 300 years earlier.
Wickham began by identifying a contradiction within the Roman ruling 
class, which was heightened from the beginning of the fifth century. The 
acquisition of land made individual members liable for tax, which they 
tried with increasing success to evade, this reducing the resources available to 
them collectively as state-managers. The main recipient of state-funding was 
the army, engaged in increasingly futile attempts to repel the Germanic 
invasions – attempts whose lack of success provided an even greater incentive 
24. Bois himself admits that he might be ‘reproached for an excessive legalism’, but claims 
that: ‘The social condition of the slave changed without slavery disappearing, just as workers’ 
conditions have changed since the nineteenth century without it therefore being possible to 
assume the definitive disappearance of this class.’ (Bois 1992, pp. 17, 18.)
25. Moore is clearly unhappy about the Marxist connotations of term ‘revolution’, but 
nevertheless argues that a ‘new social order’, dominated by ‘the clerici who became the power 
elite of the new Europe’ and who ‘constituted a class in all but name’ (Moore 2000, p. 6).
26. Wickham 1994b, p. 29.
27. Wickham 1994b, p. 26.
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to tax-evasion. Meanwhile, the German invaders began to appear an attractive 
alternative to supporting a declining but acquisitive state-apparatus. As 
Wickham stresses, however, ‘tax-evading aristocrats’, although important, 
were not the only social actors involved in achieving the transition.28 Peasants 
played a far greater rôle but, despite several important risings from early in the 
fifth century, not principally as participants in open class-struggle. Instead, 
they hastened the internal disintegration of the Empire by placing themselves 
under the protection of landowners, effectively renouncing their independence 
on the assumption that not only would their new status as tenants not carry 
tax-liabilities, but their new lords would be capable of avoiding such 
responsibilities themselves, and, consequently, would not pass them on. In 
effect, both the landowners and the peasants had reasons to choose what 
would later become known as feudal social relations.
These pressures also applied in the East, but the outcomes were different, 
mainly because, in the West, the crisis of taxation coincided with an additional 
factor: the Germanic invasions. The triumph of the barbarians did not 
immediately lead to total transformation: ‘The new Germanic states were 
not yet feudal.’29 Taxation continued, but without the need for a centralised 
army – since the new states raised armies from their own landowners and 
retainers – the main purpose for raising taxation no longer existed. Taxation 
became increasingly fragmented: inessential for supporting monarchs, whose 
wealth derived from their own estates, it became principally used for securing 
support through gifts or bribes. Previously, members of the ruling class had 
sought to acquire land in order to gain access to control of the state-apparatus, 
but now it became an end in itself: ‘Private landowning was henceforth no 
longer the means to the obtaining of power; it was itself power.’30 The scene 
was by no means uniform: in some areas, such as the British Isles, some areas 
reverted to pre-class agrarian societies; in others, such as the German Lands, 
pre-class societies co-existed with feudal relations in a subordinate position; 
but in terms of the state, ‘all were feudal, for they were based on the politics 
and economics of landowning, expressed in different ways’.31
Why, then, the difference with the East? Wickham argued that, in addition 
to the slave-mode, the Roman Empire had at different times also involved the 
feudal and the tributary modes, based respectively on rent and tax. Wickham 
originally argued that these two modes emerged as dominant from the fifth 
century, effectively maintaining different aspects of the later Roman Empire; 
28. Wickham 1994b, p. 20.
29. Wickham 1994b, p. 23.
30. Wickham 1994b, p. 28.
31. Wickham 1994b, p. 33.
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feudalism in the West and the tributary mode in Byzantium. And, while 
Wickham was clear that the tributary mode was not simply a re-labelling of 
the ‘Asiatic’ mode, which he rightly dismisses, he also emphasised that it did 
exist in other regions, above all in the Chinese Empire.32 The distinction 
between feudal and tributary modes drew far more response than his account 
of the transition. In particular, Berktay and Haldon pointed out that, in terms 
of the central exploitative relationship with the peasantry, there was no 
difference between these; the difference lay in the extent and nature of state-
power, but Marxists do not distinguish between modes on superstructural 
grounds – that would be to fall into precisely the error which all contributors 
to the debate criticised Anderson.33 Wickham accepted this criticism, as he 
pointed out on the republication of his early essays in Land and Power:
The basic economic division inside class societies thus becomes simply that 
between societies based on taking surpluses from peasants (or, for that matter, 
household-based artisans) and those based on withholding surplus from wage 
labourers. . . . It does not mean that the Chinese or Roman empires, the Frankish 
kingdoms, and the feudal world of the eleventh century were exactly the same, 
for an essential structural difference remains between the first two, and tax-raising 
state systems (with aristocracies subject to them), and the second two, polities 
dominated by aristocratic rent-taking and Marc Bloch’s politics of land.34
Like the positions to which he was opposed, Wickham could find support for 
his alternatives in respect of both chronology and modes of production in 
Marx’s own writings, specifically in the Grundrisse, that most ambiguous of his 
major works. As Hobsbawm wrote in an important early commentary: 
‘Feudalism appears to be an alternative evolution out of primitive communalism, 
under conditions in which no cities develop, because the density of population 
over a large region is low.’35 Similarly, although Wickham derived his use of 
the tributary mode from Amin, the concept, if not the actual term, can also be 
found in the pages of Marx’s notebooks: ‘In the case of the slave relationship, 
the serf relationship, and the relationship of tribute (where the primitive 
community is under consideration), it is the slaveowner, the feudal lord or the 
state receiving tribute that is the owner of the product and therefore its seller.’36 
Wickham therefore had at least as much reason to claim a relationship to the 
Marxist classics as his opponents.
32. Wickham 1994b, pp. 36–40; Wickham 1994c, pp. 43–50, 73–4.
33. Berktay 1987, pp. 301–10; Haldon 1989, pp. 9–15; Haldon 1993, pp. 63–9, 87–109.
34. Wickham 1994c, p. 75.
35. Hobsbawm 1965, p. 28. See also p. 32.
36. Marx 1973, p. 443. See also Amin 1976, pp. 15–16.
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Themes, theories, absences
After a professional career as a historian principally of the Tuscan region of 
Italy, Wickham has now returned to the subject of the post-Roman world as a 
whole. During the debate on the feudal revolution, Wickham commented on 
Bisson’s dating of that process to between 850 and 1100, noting that ‘250 
years is a long time for a revolution’, and argued that it was preferable to see 
the period as one of consolidation or formalisation of a feudal system which 
had already been established: ‘Like the Industrial Revolution, or the varying 
moments of middle-class political assertion in Europe that began with the 
French Revolution, this major shift could be fast or slow, (relatively) peaceful 
or sharply violent, and the variations themselves shed light on the structural 
differences between one region and another.’37 In effect, Framing the Early 
Middle Ages is a massive depiction of the prior process of feudal emergence, 
empirically substantiating the picture which he sketched out over twenty years 
ago, taking into account his changed position on the modes-of-production 
debate. This is no mere coda to the earlier debate on the transition to feudalism, 
but a re-engagement with the issue’s greater significance than any of the 
original contributions.
Starting from the dissolution of the political unity and relative economic 
homogeneity of the Roman Empire, he traces how the constituent regions 
diverged from each other as successor-societies adopted particular aspects of 
the imperial experience. As we should expect from his previous work, Wickham 
is particularly interested in the notion of the fiscal régime, which he sees as 
simplifying and, in some places, disappearing altogether, with obvious 
implications for whether society was dominated by a feudal politics of land or 
tributary extraction by the state. Central to the book is the fate of the two 
great classes: the peasantry and the aristocracy, sometimes antagonistic, 
sometimes co-existent. The former achieved greater autonomy and, in some 
areas, freedom from exploitation altogether; indeed, in some respects, Wickham 
describes a golden age for peasants, compared to the oppression from which 
they had been released, or the oppression to which they would eventually be 
subjected. A condition of peasant-freedom was the weakening power of the 
aristocracy, the character of which also changed, becoming more narrowly 
focussed on its military rôle and abandoning the literary culture which had 
been important to the Romans. This, too, was only a temporary condition, 
before the reassertion of their dominance by the end of the period. Throughout 
it, however, Wickham is clear that the aristocrats are, in most respects, the key 
social actors. Large-scale production at the regional level, let alone inter-
37. Wickham 1997, pp. 207–8.
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regional long-distance exchange, was structured by ‘élite-consumption’, in the 
absence of mass peasant-demand: the wealthier the aristocracy, the greater the 
demand. But that wealth was, in turn, determined by two of the elements 
Wickham sees as constitutive of the transitional economy: the extent, reach 
and effectiveness of the tax-system, and the level of exploitation of the peasantry 
by the lords. To these must be added two more elements, one contingent and 
the other deeply structural: the retarding effect of war and the extent to which 
a region continued to be integrated into the post-imperial Mediterranean 
world-system.
The scope of this survey, and the command which Wickham presents it to 
the reader means that Framing will inevitably and rightly be compared to the 
other great Deutscher Prize-winning work of premodern history, Geoffrey de 
Ste Croix’s The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World. That work famously 
begins with a lengthy consideration of the theoretical concepts which Ste 
Croix then uses to structure his argument.38 Wickham does not adopt this 
strategy. Although there is, of course, a theoretical apparatus at work behind 
the scenes, Wickham draws back the curtain to reveal it only in tantalisingly 
short passages, usually where some sort of definition is required. Typically, this 
was also the approach taken by the earlier generation of British-Marxist 
historians such as Rodney Hilton – to pick one specifically identified as an 
influence by Wickham – at least in their substantive works.39 This approach 
has much to recommend it, especially when compared to the endless theoretical 
preliminaries that were typical of, for example Hindess and Hirst, at the time 
Wickham began to publish; but, here, the very richness of empirical detail 
means that underlying theoretical positions have sometimes to be inferred. 
This lack of explicit discussion creates a barrier for the reader, not to checking 
Wickham’s conformity to some Marxist orthodoxy or other, but to assessing 
how his assumptions have shaped his use of the material. On one methodological 
issue, however, Wickham is explicit: his rejection of teleological explanations 
of capitalist development, particularly, ‘the metanarrative of medieval economic 
history which seeks to explain the secular economic triumph of north-west 
Europe’. Instead, he emphasises ‘the variegated patterns of social development’ 
and argues that ‘social change is overwhelmingly the result of internal factors, 
not external influences’.40 By external influences, Wickham seems to mean the 
view (which he identifies with Pirenne, although it can be traced back to 
Smith) that feudalism arose as a result of outside pressures.41 Wickham argues 
38. Ste. Croix 1981, pp. 19–98.
39. Wickham 1994d, p. 1.
40. Wickham 2005, p. 822; and see, more recently, Wickham 2007, p. 20.
41. In Brenner’s recent summary: ‘Feudalism had emerged, as they saw it, as a result of 
exogenous shocks, when a series of invasions – by the so-called barbarians, then the Muslims, 
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that the roots of feudalism have rather to be discerned in the internal 
development of the regions he discusses.
These regions extend from the Irish edge of Western Europe to the present-
day Middle East. The geographical compass of the book is set by the subject, 
the after-world of the united Empire, and Wickham does full justice to the 
range of different societies this involves, focusing as much on Egypt and Syria 
as on Denmark and England. The book is not completely exhaustive: Scotland 
and (for the most part) Saxony are excluded without greatly affecting his 
argument, since similar societies to these are included, although the exclusion 
of the Balkans for area-study perhaps passes up an opportunity to compare 
tributary formations in Europe with those in North Africa and Asia. But these 
are minor issues, far more important than absolute comprehensiveness is the 
fact that the parallels and similarities he draws to our attention help undermine 
another form of teleology. In this case, it is not the Western origins of capitalism 
so much as the broader narrative which distinguishes Europe, or sometimes 
simply ‘the West’, from the rest of the world on the basis of the ‘Judeo-
Christian’ heritage, or similar inventions, which supposedly date back to this 
period.
For example, the societies which showed the most sign of agricultural 
intensification during the period lay, not only at opposite extremes of the tax-/
rent-continuum, but also at opposite extremes of the territorial limits of the 
Empire: Francia on the one hand, and Egypt and the Levant on the other. 
These two regions, respectively involving ‘a rich aristocracy in the Carolingian 
world, a powerful state in that of the Umayyads and the Abbasids’ were ‘the 
regions with the most potential for exchange, and thus the most stimulus for 
agricultural intensification’42 But the same types of parallel are also apparent in 
less-complex forms of society, where the Roman state collapsed: Mauretania, 
in the Berber lands of North Africa, had a pattern of ‘social development’ 
which Wickham claims ‘resembles Britain’, although ‘its closest British 
analogues would be with more traditional highland Wales’ rather than lowland- 
England. Mauretania retained its own political traditions under the Empire, 
while Britain wholeheartedly embraced those of Rome; yet the results were 
similar, not least in terms of social simplification and economic retrogression.43 
This would suggest that, whatever the origins of the differences between West 
and finally the Vikings – disrupted the great trans-Mediterranean trade routes that had long 
nourished the European economy going back to Roman and Greek times.’ (Brenner 2007, 
p. 49.)
42. Wickham 2005, p. 302. See also p. 819, where Northern Francia and Syria and Palestine 
are taken as examples of a ‘complex regional economy based on aristocratic wealth’. 
43. Wickham 2005, p. 339.
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and East, they are clearly not intrinsic to the societies involved and have to be 
traced instead in subsequent historical developments.
Wickham’s account would also suggest that religious differences between 
Christianity and Islam are less important in determining the regional character 
than the material conditions upon which he focuses, but this has to be inferred 
since ideological issues are nowhere discussed, except briefly in relation to 
aristocratic hegemony. To be fair, Wickham makes clear from the outset that, 
because of the already-great length of the book, his focus will be on the social 
and the economic. Take, as a comparison, Braudel’s The Mediterranean and the 
Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II, in many ways a model of this kind 
of large-scale history. It begins with a part on the physical geography of the 
region where change is ‘almost imperceptible’ and ends with one on the 
political events of the fifty-year period from 1550 where change occurs in 
‘brief, rapid, nervous fluctuations’. Between is a part dealing with ‘social 
history’ where change is ‘slow’ but, nevertheless, has ‘perceptible rhythms’.44 
Wickham’s book deals with similar themes to this middle-range part of 
Braudel’s book (‘Collective Destinies and General Trends’).45 Political 
developments are only discussed to provide essential background to the regions 
under discussion, and culture is excluded completely – although not cultural 
artefacts; potsherds appear with great regularity, but only as traces of economic 
activity.46 But ‘politics’, here, has to understood primarily as what we would 
now call ‘geopolitics’ – or more simply, war – since the state, the political 
institution par excellence, is certainly of paramount importance to Wickham, 
not least because its form was ‘the arena that saw most change’.47 Indeed, 
following a brief survey of geopolitical developments, he privileges the state as 
the first area of discussion, before analysing the position of the two main 
classes, aristocrats and peasants. This is not because he sees the state as the 
‘prime mover’ in social change, ‘with the form of the state somehow determining 
every other aspect of society and the economy, in a statist version of a very 
traditional Marxist analysis’.48 Wickham is not proposing to substitute a 
superstructural determinism for one which privileges the base, but the 
structural focus of the book does mean that the actual moments of change – 
above all the moments of peasant-expropriation – tend to be subsumed within 
discussions the main focus of which is on other aspects of the period.
44. Braudel 1975a, pp. 20–1.
45. Braudel 1975a, pp. 355–642; Braudel 1975b, pp. 657–900.
46. Wickham promised, to take a more inclusive approach in what was then his forthcoming 
contribution to the Penguin History of Europe. See Wickham 2005, p. 7. He has now done so. 
See, for example, Wickham 2009, pp. 50–75, 232–51, 405–26.
47. Wickham 2005, p. 12.
48. Wickham 2005, p. 145.
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Structure: social classes, modes of production and states
Wickham argues that neither slavery nor (less controversially) wage-labour 
was of any great significance to the economy of the early middle ages:
Throughout our period the slave mode was only a minor survival, everywhere 
marginal to the basic economic structure, the landlord peasant relationship 
(where there were landlords at all). . . . The marginality of the slave mode in our 
period is matched by the relative unimportance of wage labour, at least outside 
Egypt; essentially, throughout our period, agriculture on estates was above all 
performed by peasant, tenant, cultivators.49
Slavery and unfreedom more generally had a different significance depending 
on the extent of peasant-autonomy within the locality. Where a lord had 
superiority over an entire area, as in the Ile de France, it could be a status-
distinction, with the possibility of mobility between the free and unfree. 
Ironically, it was where peasants were most free of lords, as in England before 
700 AD, that the distinction had greatest significance, indicating a potentially 
exploitative relationship within the household-economy.50 Potentially, 
Wickham argues, because the position of the unfree within the peasant-
household would only involve ‘class-exploitation’ in circumstances where ‘the 
members of the free family all stopped working, and simply lived off the labour 
of the unfree’.51 I am not sure whether this argument is sustainable. Exploitation 
still takes place in situations where small commodity-producers supplement 
the labour-work of themselves and their families with wage-labour, since 
wage-labourers produce a surplus over and above what they receive. Why 
would the situation be different in the case of a peasant-family supplementing 
their labour with that of slaves or otherwise unfree workers? If anything, the 
surplus would be greater in the second case. This does not affect Wickham’s 
argument about the irrelevance of slavery, but it does raise a question about his 
treatment of the one mode of production which he sees as seriously posing an 
alternative to feudalism: the peasant-mode.
Wickham argues that feudalism had become a universal system across 
Europe, North Africa and the Middle East by the ninth century, but what 
does he mean by feudalism? As I noted earlier, Wickham rejected his earlier 
distinction between rent and taxation as the basis for distinguishing between 
the feudal and tributary modes of production, and he retains that position 
49. Wickham 2005, pp. 260–1, 262, 264. In Egypt, wage-labour was mainly employed for 
harvest-work. For more on the absence of slaves in Italy after c. 300 AD, see pp. 276–7. 
50. Wickham 2005, pp. 435–6.
51. Wickham 2005, p. 543.
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here. He has not, however, abandoned the tributary mode itself.52 Indeed, 
following Haldon, he writes: ‘it now seems to me that both [feudalism and the 
tributary mode] are sub-types of the same mode of production, in that both 
are based on agrarian surplus extracted, by force if necessary, from the peasant 
majority’.53 The process of exploitation is the same in each case, but the 
mechanism for rent- or tax-collection is different and, as Wickham stresses, 
this leads to corresponding differences in the state, above all in two respects. 
With the important exception of Merovingian and Carolingian Francia, ‘tax-
based states were . . . richer and more powerful than rent-based, land-based, 
states’. More important even than wealth, however, was stability, which 
Wickham illustrates with the Byzantine example:
Even at the weakest point of the eastern empire, roughly 650–750, Byzantine 
political structures were more coherent than those of even the best-organised 
land-based states, such as Lombard Italy in the same period; tax-based structures 
had more staying-power, and the risk of decentralisation, a feature of all land-
based states, was less great. If taxation disappeared as the basis of any given state, 
then, no matter how much cultural, ideological, or legislative continuity there 
was . . . it would not prevent fundamental changes in political resources, 
infrastructure and practice.54
Nevertheless, both variants stand at a far greater distance from the peasant-
mode of production, involving ‘an economic and political system dominated 
by peasants, in a ranked society’ than they do from each other.55
Societies based on the peasant-mode involve ‘clear status differences . . . but 
they are not necessarily stable or heavily marked, except for the distinction, 
always present, between free and unfree’.56 According to Wickham, there were 
many varieties of the peasant-mode, but the essential features for him are that 
the productive unit is the household and that each household works land that 
it directly controls. Relations between households are governed by reciprocal 
exchange, partly to consolidate community-relations, partly to acquire goods 
to which individual households would not otherwise have access. Since 
communities based on the peasant-mode do not have to produce a surplus for 
an exploiting class, the main impulse behind production is to allow maximum-
leisure compatible with satisfaction of physical needs and cultural norms; 
indeed, there are strong social pressures on individual households not to 
52. Contrary to what is suggested in Harman 2006, pp. 189–90.
53. Wickham 2008, p. 60.
54. Wickham 2005, p. 145.
55. Wickham 2005, pp. 60, 61.
56. Wickham 2005, p. 304.
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increase production beyond certain limits, since the output will either be given 
away to other, less-productive neighbours or, if retained, lead to the household 
being ostracised by the rest of the community. Society under the peasant-
mode should not, of course, be regarded as ‘primitive-communist’, since, in 
addition to the use of unfree labour, it is inegalitarian in respect to both 
gender-relations and the act of giving itself, which confers high status or rank 
to those who can give the most. The latter relationship is not, however, fixed, 
in that positions within the status-group can change. During the period, the 
peasant-mode would have existed in two forms, either in a dominant ‘tribal’ 
form, as in large parts of Northern Europe, but also Spain and North Africa, 
where a relatively small external tribute might have to be paid to a local lord; 
or scattered like islands (Wickham writes about ‘leopard-spots’) among 
territories otherwise dominated by the feudal mode of production, as in 
Francia and Italy.57
Wickham assembles an impressive array of evidence to demonstrate the 
existence of the peasant-mode, and his historiographical achievement also 
supports an important socialist argument. The existence of an original classless 
society, ‘primitive communism’, is regularly denied by supporters of capitalism, 
for whom it is an enormously dangerous idea, suggesting as it does that 
inequality and exploitation are not, as it were, natural conditions. Wickham 
rejects both the term and, as we have seen, the implication that it involved 
complete equality in relation to this period; but, if he is right, then it means 
that, in some regions at least, the collapse of class-societies in their slave- and 
tributary forms did not lead to the ‘war of all against all’, but, rather, to a 
situation in which cooperation was the dominant characteristic. Although the 
situation is scarcely likely to be repeated should capitalism collapse, it is 
nevertheless an important historical contribution to the debates over human 
nature. But, is the peasant-mode effectively the same as the ‘Asiatic’ mode, 
where the latter is taken to be a general term for mode dominant in transitions 
between classless and class-societies?58 In other words, although the peasant-
mode seems to be the ‘fall-back’ position for peasants where precapitalist class-
society collapses, is it also a dynamic mode which would in time produce a 
new or revived form of class-society? I will return to these issues below.
57. Wickham 2005, pp. 538–41.
58. See, for example, Godelier 1978, p. 241. In my view, this is the only way in which the 
notion of the Asiatic mode can be sensibly applied. Nevertheless, Wickham’s notion of a peasant-
mode is preferable, not only because it is free from the other connotations surrounding the 
‘Asiatic’, but also – and, more importantly – because it foregrounds the class involved in the 
production-process. 
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The absence of classes, or, at any rate, the absence of classes relating to each 
other as exploiter and exploited, also suggests the absence of a state, and 
Wickham accordingly argues that this was the case where the peasant-mode 
was dominant. He defines the state as an institution combining a series of key-
elements: a centralised public authority apparently distinct from the public 
itself; ‘the centralisation of legitimately enforceable authority (justice and the 
army); the specialisation of governmental rôles, with an official hierarchy 
which outlasted the people who held official position at any one time; the 
concept of a public power, that is, of a ruling system ideologically separable 
from the ruled population and from the individual rulers themselves; 
independent and stable resources for the rulers; and a class-based system for 
surplus-extraction and stratification’. On this basis, he identifies three types of 
state: ‘strong’, as in the Roman, Byzantine and Arabic empires; ‘weak’, as in 
Romano-Germanic kingdoms of southern Europe like Gaul, Italy and Spain; 
and non-existent (‘pre-state’), as in the non-Roman kingdoms of north-
western Europe like Ireland, England and Denmark – in other words, where 
the peasant-mode was strongest. As Wickham rightly remarks, the point of a 
definition is its usefulness: how useful is this one?59
It is useful in so far as it helps us to remember that state-formation is a 
lengthy process, which, if captured by the historian before the end, will reveal an 
institution that is not yet a state, but is (to use Draper’s terminology), a ‘proto-
government’ exercising ‘proto-political’ power. States take as long as classes to 
form, but this indicates my first difficulty with Wickham’s definition, namely 
that he places too much emphasis on region-wide formal attributes. If classes 
do exist, and Wickham accepts that lords tended to co-exist with peasants even 
under the peasant-mode, then the imposition of coercion and control is no 
longer exercised entirely by the community as a whole, but by a part with 
separate juridical powers.60 In this context, aristocrats and landowners more 
generally can act as a ‘state’, can embody state-functions, at quite local levels.
A further theoretical problem is suggested by the relationship between the 
fourth and fifth characteristics of a state in Wickham’s definition (independent 
and stable resources for the rulers; and a class-based system for surplus-
extraction and stratification): ‘It is worth distinguishing between the resources 
of rulers and those of the ruling class, because one can often, even though not 
always, draw a distinction between the two (e.g. tax versus rent).’ Wickham 
acknowledges that, where taxation was the overwhelmingly dominant method 
of surplus-extraction, it could be subsumed into the provision of resources for 
59. Wickham 2005, pp. 56–7, and n. 2. See also pp. 303–4. 
60. Draper 1978, pp. 239–45.
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rulers ‘and the ruling class were simply public employees’: ‘In practice, however, 
dominant classes have almost always been distinguishable from state-
institutions; they are independently wealthy, although they characteristically 
seek wealth as well as power from official positions in public hierarchies.’ And, 
in landed societies where rent is the dominant method of surplus-extraction, 
the subsumption operates in reverse, with ‘the resources of kings [becoming] 
nearly identical with [those] of the ruling class as a whole’.61 The distinction 
between ‘rulers’ and ‘ruling classes’ here seems to be unnecessary to Wickham’s 
argument. In the analysis of contemporary capitalism, there are usually some 
differences of interest between those who manage the state and those who own 
or control capital, although these always overlap, are currently decreasing and, 
in any case, tend to be overridden by joint class-membership of the bourgeoisie. 
To the extent that these differences do exist, they are a reflection of the (much 
exaggerated) ‘separation of the economic and the political under capitalism’.62 
But, under feudalism, or any other precapitalist mode of production, the 
separation does not exist. Consequently, until the emergence of the absolutist 
state from the late-fifteenth century, the possibility of a clash of interests 
between what one might call the political and economic wings of the ruling 
class does not arise. The resistance of Roman aristocrats to being taxed by the 
Imperial state, to which Wickham gave a central explanatory rôle in his initial 
account of the transition, might be cited as an example which supports the 
rulers/ruling-class distinction (indeed, it lent plausibility to the claim that the 
feudal and tributary modes were distinct); but, precisely because it occurred at 
an exceptional moment of systemic breakdown, it scarcely reflects the ‘normal’ 
operation of class-society. It is not clear what behaviours are explained by this 
distinction which would not otherwise be so. Indeed, to maintain it would 
seem to suggest that both groups operated with potentially different ‘logics’, 
which undermines Wickham’s – in my view, correct – argument about the 
fundamental unity of the feudal and tributary modes.
Agency: social revolution, socio-economic transition and the class-struggle
Who were the agents behind the transition to feudalism, where it did not 
emerge directly from the end of the slave-mode? Although Wickham broadly 
endorses what he calls the historiographical ‘cliché’ of serfdom emerging as a 
combination of tightened constraints on formerly free tenants and loosened 
constraints on the formerly unfree, his own emphasis on the relative 
61. Wickham 2005, p. 304.
62. See Davidson 2010, pp. 82–3.
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unimportance of slavery suggests that the former was of considerably greater 
importance.63 The fate of the free peasantry is central issue; the question is the 
extent to which it was undermined from within, by the emergence of class-
divisions, or overthrown from without, by submission to an existing class of 
aristocrats and landowners.
Wickham points to an inconsistency in Marx’s own approach over the 
‘prime mover’ behind changes from one mode to another, contrasting the 
more abstract formulations such as the 1859 ‘Preface’ which privilege 
the development of the forces of production, and actual historical analysis 
such as Capital, Volume I, where he shows that changes to the relations of 
production take priority. For this reason, Wickham supports the position 
taken by Robert Brenner, which follows the latter aspect of Marx’s own work.64 
The problem for Wickham, as for Brenner, is what drives changes to the 
relations of production? Wickham repeats the oft-expressed claim that, for 
Brenner, it is the class-struggle.65 However, as I argued in the 2004 Deutscher 
lecture, Brenner is actually far less interested in the class-struggle than is 
generally supposed. Since he believes that there is no impulse for the forces of 
production to develop, class-struggle acts instead, for him, as a mechanism for 
producing (or failing to produce) a set of ‘unintended consequences’, which in 
turn lay the initial conditions for the formation of capitalist social relations of 
production.66 As presented by Wickham, the peasant-mode before the 
consolidation of feudalism bears a close resemblance to the description of the 
peasantry under feudalism presented by Brenner, prior to the emergence of 
capitalism, particularly in relation to its internal stability and the lack of 
motivation to develop technology or increase productivity beyond a certain 
point.67
Leaving aside the question of whether both can be right, Wickham is more 
open to the possibility of feudalism emerging from internal developments 
within the peasant-mode than Brenner is of capitalism emerging from internal 
developments within the feudal mode. Wickham allows, for example, that a 
‘feudal-economic logic’ may be set in train when peasants with high status 
begin to require others to provide them with goods in return for more-
specialised, but less-material services, of which he specifies military protection 
(although, presumably, religious functions would also be relevant here).68 He 
63. Wickham 2005, p. 563.
64. Wickham 2008, pp. 6–7, 11.
65. Wickham 2007, pp. 42–3. 
66. Davidson 2005a, p. 16.
67. Brenner 1986, p. 53; Brenner 1997, p. 23; Brenner 2007, pp. 88–9.
68. Wickham 2005, p. 539.
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also notes that peasants can acquire sufficient land to be able to lease it out to 
tenants, thus elevating themselves into the landowning class, with the potential 
to ultimately join the aristocracy.69 But these are mainly presented as 
hypothetical cases, rather than a process which can actually be traced. Of the 
two examples which he offers, one is from the actual Danish village of Vorbasse 
and the other from his invented archetypal village of ‘Malling’. It is clear that 
evidence is lacking, and Wickham explains his reliance on models of change 
‘for we can so seldom see them happening in our sources’.70 Consequently, 
when Wickham discusses the shift to feudal relations of production, he 
generally does so in contexts where they are introduced by an agency from 
outside the peasant-community, namely existing landowners and aristocrats. 
But it is not clear whether this was the main path to the establishment of a 
‘feudal-economic logic’, or simply the most visible at this distance in time. The 
extent to which feudalism was a ‘bottom-up’ in addition to a ‘top-down’ affair 
remains an area which still requires further research.
There are three types of class-struggle ‘from below’ recorded by Wickham, 
none of which would necessarily contribute to the rise of feudalism. The first 
are slave-revolts. Wickham gives only one example, a tantalising reference 
what he calls the ‘famous’ Zanj slave-revolt in southern Iraq during the 870s.71 
This event may enjoy fame among scholars of the medieval Middle East, but 
it might have received greater consideration for the benefit of non-specialists, 
particularly given the emphasis Wickham places on the relative unimportance 
of slavery during his period.
The second are tax-revolts. The examples to which Wickham devotes most 
attention took place in Umayyad, then Abbasid Egypt between 726 and 832 
AD. These were not the actions of a particular class, like slaves, but overlapping 
risings, first by a pre-existing religious community (the Christian-Coptic sect), 
then by Arab settlers, and, finally, by an alliance of the two. Wickham argues 
that these were provoked, not by higher levels of taxation than under the 
Empire, but rather because it tended to be more arbitrary and, above all, ‘more 
stringently enforced, and more aggressively policed’. The reasons lie in the fact 
that the Arab rulers did not transform the societies they occupied, but 
established themselves as a ‘state-class’ maintained solely by taxation, ‘with no 
structural social links to taxpayers’, meaning that patronage of client-groups as 
a channel for allowing the latter to mitigate or avoid tax was not an option.72 
Peasants also rebelled against taxation, in some cases supported after the fact 
69. Wickham 2005, p. 386.
70. Wickham 2005, pp. 572–3.
71. Wickham 2005, p. 141.
72. Wickham 2005, pp. 140–3, 532.
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by local religious figures: Wickham records one episode in Eukraoi in West 
Galatia (modern-day Turkey), where the local bishop and ‘holy man’, Theodore 
of Skyeon, dismissed the local aristocratic administrator and tax-collector after 
a rising by the villagers.73 This was not, however, the main focus of peasant-
action.
The third are peasant-revolts, but these are different from predecessors 
under the Roman Empire and successors under the consolidated feudal régime. 
Earlier peasant-revolts, above all that of the Bagaudae against the Roman 
Empire in Gaul, were essentially directed against taxation and injustice at a 
time when the state was weakened and therefore the possibility of change 
beneficial to the peasantry became possible. Later peasant-revolts, too, were 
conducted against the state in relation to ‘military service, laws on status and, 
above all, taxation’.74 In this period, revolts have a different impetus. Wickham 
notes that: ‘A detailed knowledge of peasant states of mind is largely closed to 
us before the fourteenth century.’ He nevertheless speculates that aristocratic 
hegemony did function in certain areas where the peasants had to rely 
on aristocrats for external support, as in eighth-century Lucchesia (in 
modern Italy), although this did not, of course exclude ‘small-scale signs of 
disobedience’, but these are compatible with overall acceptance of ruling 
values. At the other end of the spectrum, as in eighth-century Paris, the 
aristocrats dominated through ‘overwhelming physical force’ and did not 
require peasant-acceptance of their rule, which they, in any case, did not 
receive. Between these lies a third type of area, such as sixth-century Galatia, 
where neither situation prevailed; that is, where aristocrats could rely neither 
on ideology nor violence to secure compliance. As Wickham notes, the latter 
situation is where revolts are most likely to take place, but: ‘The absence of 
hegemony is only one reason why peasants revolt, of course; they have to have 
something concrete to oppose as well.’75 In this case, peasant-revolts are signs 
of resistance to attempts by the emergent ruling class to impose serfdom. 
England is exceptional in its lack of peasant-revolt, which seems to have two 
causes. First, because initially both the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruling class’ (to use 
Wickham’s distinction) has less control over the peasantry than in any other 
part of Europe, while, at the same time, they exercised superiority over 
exceptionally large territories. Second, in that, when the lords did move to 
subject or expropriate peasant-communities, they did so slowly and in 
piecemeal fashion, attacking the weakest whilst leaving the strongest and 
wealthiest untouched until the basis of possible collective resistance was 
73. Wickham 2005, p. 408.
74. Wickham 2005, pp. 529–33.
75. Wickham 2005, p. 441.
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eroded.76 Elsewhere, the gradual encroachments of the emergent feudal state 
led to what Wickham calls ‘frequent small scale resistance’, which erupted 
into one the great risings of the period: the Stellinga revolt in Saxony of 
AD 841–2, a revolt which took the opportunity of a civil war among the local 
Saxon ruling class to launch a programme for the return to the pre-aristocratic 
social order.77
Could war be treated as the functional equivalent of revolution, in the sense 
of the revolutions from outside and above conducted by the Cromwellian and 
Napoleonic armies a thousand years later? One of Wickham’s critics has 
certainly accused him ignoring the impact of war; indeed, of being in thrall to 
an ‘Austro-German model of explaining great transitions in human history’, a 
model with ‘little or no theorisation of war or violence’.78 The ‘Austro-German 
model’ evidently includes Marxism, and Wickham himself has made a similar 
point about it in the past; but it is untrue.79 More to the point, in this case, it 
is also irrelevant: war can be important as an agent of social change, but it is 
scarcely autonomous. It is difficult to see how war could be the source of a new 
form of society, since all the societies involved were based on variations of the 
same mode of production and the most ideologically innovative – the Arab 
invaders of the later-seventh century – tended to allow the continuation of 
existing social structures in the territories they conquered. The most significant 
social impact of war was, in fact, an inadvertent consequence of the Vandal 
invasions of North Africa, of which Wickham writes: ‘Geiseric’s conquest of 
Carthage in 439 is arguably the turning point in the “fall” of the western 
empire.’ The significance of the conquest being that it ‘broke the tax spine’ 
connecting the Roman world-economy.80 But elsewhere, the impact was 
muted: as Wickham notes, ‘only Italy in the sixth century and Anatolia in the 
seventh saw wars that really devastated economies and societies on the regional 
level for more than short periods’.81
In short, class-struggle clearly occurred in different forms throughout the 
period, but revolutionary movements for the transformation of society, or 
plausible surrogates, are absent – except, of course, in the form of the piecemeal 
revolution from above imposed by the lords to either abolish the economic 
76. Wickham 2005, pp. 350–1.
77. Wickham 2005, pp. 578–88.
78. Shaw 2008, p. 106. The charge gains some traction when Wickham, who, at one point, 
included war as one of the four elements of the economic dynamic, subsequently reduces them 
to three: ‘fiscal demand, private demand, [and] prior dependence on the Roman world-system’ 
(Wickham 2005, p. 821). Compare Wickham 2005, p. 719.
79. Wickham 1988, p. 77. For Marxist analysis of war and military competition more 
generally, see Callinicos 1995, pp. 116–25.
80. Wickham 2005, pp. 87, 711.
81. Wickham 2005, p. 827.
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logic of the peasant-mode or erode the autonomy of peasants where the feudal 
mode already existed. Wickham has argued that the interaction between the 
forces and relations of production, and between them and the superstructure, 
may vary from one mode of production to another. Be that as it may, what 
he makes unmistakably clear in this work, among many other things of value 
to historical materialists, is that the nature of the transitions from one mode 
to another are certainly distinct, and that we proceed by analogy with later 
ones at our peril. Whatever questions Framing the Middle Ages still leaves 
unanswered – and many of those we are only able to ask because of Wickham’s 
achievement – we should be grateful that we now have an account of the 
transition to feudalism to rival those on the transition to capitalism which 
have for so long been the staples of Marxist historiography.
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